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In this lecture, I will try to start answering the question of whether the pension reforms enacted in 
Europe since the 1990s will prove to be sustainable. This broad question has embedded in it both 
theoretical and empirical sub-questions. On the theoretical side, I will need to see how best to measure 
pension adequacy, while also assessing the feasibility of evaluating jointly pension adequacy and 
financial sustainability. Once this is tackled, I will be assessing the possible impact of reforms on the 
capacity of pension systems to achieve their goals and the impact on the constraints they face. This 
should help understand better any sources of possible pressures that could undermine the 
sustainability of pension reforms. 
Most of the existing literature on the sustainability of pension reforms focuses solely on 
financial sustainability. Taken to the extreme, some studies determine sustainability in direct 
proportion to the decline in state pension spending projections expected as a result of a reform. 
Pension adequacy and financial sustainability tend to be seen as conflicting aims. However, it is 
increasingly evident that this is not the case. It is true that costly systems create pressures for 
retrenchment (for instance, take the reforms made in Italy in the 1990s). However, there are recent 
examples of policy changes which reflect adequacy concerns (for instance, take how recent reforms in 
the UK have reversed most of the major 1980s pension policies). In fact, one could argue that there is 
a sort of policy vicious circle, where reforms first over-focus on adequacy, these prove to be too 
expensive and cuts are effected, and then adequacy concerns resurface. This suggests that the 
sustainability of reforms depends on the effects of changes on both system aims and constraints. 
            State pension systems have two main aims, the importance of which differs across countries. 
On the one hand, they are meant to enable elderly persons to have an income above the poverty 
threshold (i.e. the poverty alleviation role). On the other, they are meant to enable income or 
consumption smoothing over the lifecycle, enabling individuals to maintain their standard of living 
unchanged (i.e. the income replacement role). The achievement of these aims however needs to be 
done within the limits imposed by two main constraints. Systems need to be financially sustainable – 
in that future workers are not faced with very high contributions compared to those paid at present. 
They also need to ensure intergenerational balance – such that the size of future pensions is not very 
small compared to those received by current pensioners. 
                                                          
* Lecture given at an international conference on “Pension adequacy and sustainability” held on the 20th 
September 2013 in Budapest and published in pp. 112-120 of “Pension adequacy and sustainability” (2014), 
Jozsef Meszaros (ed.), Budapest: Central Administration of National Pension Insurance Hungary. 
1
 The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the organisations with which he 
is affiliated. The simulation model APEX, used to derive pension wealth estimates, was kindly provided by the 
Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs of the OECD. The author is particularly indebted to 
Edward Whitehouse and Monika Queisser, for their kind help, advice and support. 
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 However, at present, most analysis of the effect of pension reforms focuses on theoretical 
replacement rates and on projected pension spending as a % of GDP. Theoretical replacement rates 
compare the expected pension to be received at the point of retirement to the pre-retirement income of 
the individual. These projections are calculated on the basis of assumptions – typically that the 
individual is a male with a full-career on the average wage. These projections tend to be made 
separately from projections of pension spending, which typically are based on broader models that 
adopt more realistic assumptions on pension entitlements. Nevertheless these projections are still a 
point-in-time indicator, and do not give a clear indication of the full burden of pension entitlements 
for future taxpayers. Similarly theoretical replacement rates, besides the obvious issue of them being 
based on unrealistic assumptions – particularly for women, also focus on just one point in time. In this 
way they fail to account of the fact that the relative value of pensions tends to change over time and 
that the period for which they are received also differs across generations. These are important 
considerations. For instance, on average, after ten years in retirement, replacement rates are down by a 
tenth from their starting value. The longer we live, the more the impact of indexation is on adequacy. 
 Instead of having separate frameworks to assess aims and constraints, I propose using one 
base measure – pension wealth. As the latter is the discounted stream of all future pension payments, 
it captures the effects of changing longevity on total flows and of indexation on the relative value of 
flows after retirement. Take for instance a case where the initial replacement rate is 50%, and stays 
the same after a reform. Looking at just replacement rates would imply no change. However assume 
that individuals will live longer in the future. This means that the State will transfer more money to 
them in total than it does to current pensioners. Similarly assume that a reform changes how the value 
of the pension changes after the first year. In this case it does not make sense to argue that the reform 
left things unchanged. Finally assume that replacement rates remain the same but the pension age is 
increased. Again this would show up in pension wealth estimates but not in replacement rates. That 
said, looking at pension wealth by itself is also deceptive. For instance women have pension wealth 
higher than men, but then they have to spread this over longer retirements. This is why one needs a 
benchmark that reflects the period of retirement which the pension wealth needs to finance. 
The other issue that needs tackling is adopting assumptions that are closer to reality. The 
impact of reforms tends to depend on the income of the individual and their labour market 
participation. In many countries, those on low incomes get a better return on contributions, while 
those with career breaks are disadvantaged. Assuming full careers on average income ignores this. 
Over the years, the OECD has constructed a very useful model of pension entitlements which 
allows one to study the impact of different wage levels and career lengths. I will use this model – 
APEX – to study pension reforms made from the 1990s till 2009 in ten countries. These countries 
include very different systems such as the Bismarkian systems of Austria, France, Italy and Germany, 
the liberal system of the UK, the social democratic systems of Finland and Sweden, and the Eastern 
European systems of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Together these countries account for 70% of the 
EU’s population. They have carried out very different reforms, including moves to notional defined 
contribution (NDC) systems and parametric changes. They also differ significantly in terms of their 
current achievements and pressures (e.g. Italy is a high spender but still has high poverty). For each 
country, I model the entitlements of a full-time individual at each decile of the full-time wage 
distribution, a part-timer earning the average part-time wage and someone on minimum pensions. 
Instead of assuming full careers, I use career lengths reflecting actual and projected participation.   
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To assess the strength of the poverty alleviation role, I compare pension wealth estimates with 
projected national disposable income, so as to see what relative income threshold entitlements can 
support, on average, through retirement. As for income smoothing, I convert pension wealth estimates 
of my different hypothetical individuals into the average replacement rate over retirement. Turning to 
system constraints, intergenerational balance is assessed by comparing directly pension wealth of 
different generations; while financial sustainability is evaluated by determining what contribution rate 
is needed from a generation of workers to finance the pension wealth of a generation of pensioners.     
Figure 1: Achievable relative poverty thresholds: pre- and post-reform 
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As can be seen from Figure 1, reforms have reduced the strength of the poverty alleviation 
function. The average achievable relative poverty threshold across countries for men is 67%, going 
down to 60% by 2050. The average for women is 52%, rising slightly to 53%. Here I have focused on 
the entitlements of those in the bottom half of the wage distribution, who are more dependent on state 
pensions. Generosity is set to improve slightly in some countries, like France and Germany – on 
account of higher labour participation, especially among women. On the other hand, in some other 
countries, such as Poland and Slovakia, declines are more pronounced as reforms tighten the link 
between benefits and contributions. Progressive elements in benefit formulae have also been removed.  
Figure 2: Average achievable replacement rates: pre- and post-reform 
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There are similar trends when one looks at average achievable replacement rates – i.e. the 
strength of income smoothing. The loss here is relatively stronger and it is evident that in countries 
like Poland, Austria and Italy the state pension on its own will not be enough to sustain pre-retirement 
levels of consumption.  Again the decline is more pronounced for men, as these already have high 
labour participation rates. The impact on full-careers differs – in some cases the reforms favour those 
with full careers. However in many cases, replacement rates for those on high incomes have been cut, 
while generosity for those on low incomes was maintained. But there are exceptions – in Poland and 
Slovakia those at the bottom face the toughest challenge as the system is much less progressive. 
Figure 3: Intergenerational balance: pension wealth of 2005 and 2050 pensioners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intergenerational fairness would have been quite at risk, had there been no reforms. Future 
generations would have got much larger pension transfers as a result of increasing longevity. The 
reforms appear to have addressed this. So while year-on-year replacement rates may have fallen, 
generally, future pensioners still get more transfers than current ones, with the exception of Italy, 
Poland and Slovakia. In these countries the drop is quite significant and reflects the large financial 
problems which these countries would have faced had they retained their previous system rules. 
Figure 4: Contribution rates needed to finance pension transfers: pre- and post-reform 
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Without reforms, the cost of financing the large increase in net pension wealth would have 
required very significant hikes in contribution rates. At present, across these ten countries, pension 
transfers require some 17.5% of wages in order to be financed over the medium term. Without reform 
this would have needed to rise to 47%. The reforms will cut this increase, on average across these 
countries to 27%. Without the reforms Hungary, Italy, Poland and Slovakia would have been 
seriously hard-placed. Quite unfortunately, despite substantial cuts, the cost of the pension system in 
Poland and Slovakia will still increase substantially – reflecting quite strong demographic 
developments combined with low labour market participation. A similar increase is projected for 
France – but here this is mostly due to the low state pension age.   
Figure 5: Development of achievement of system aims over the next decades 
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Figure 5 summarises how the achievement of pension system aims should evolve between 
2005 and 2050. There is a broad convergence of system achievements. Most countries appear to be 
converging towards providing pension wealth which keeps individuals close to the 60% poverty 
threshold throughout retirement. The only outliers appear to be Poland and Slovakia. There is less 
convergence in terms of consumption smoothing. It is clear how in some countries, the consumption 
smoothing role is diminishing in its relative importance as against poverty alleviation. Generosity cuts 
have tended to hit middle-to-high incomes more. However, in the absence of improved contribution 
records, the move to tighten the link between contributions and benefits could hurt those on low 
incomes – particularly in the absence of crediting arrangements and adequate minimum pensions.  
Turning to pressure on pension system constraints (see Figure 6), here there is less 
convergence. The response of policymakers appears to have depended on the challenge faced. Some 
countries have managed to reduce growth in net pension wealth below that induced by longevity. This 
is particularly true for the entitlements of women, as state pension ages have been equalised across 
genders. However, in many cases, net pension wealth has been retained nearly constant, but at the cost 
of higher implied contribution rates. Where contribution rates would have had to increase a lot, 
policymakers appear to have taken steps to cut net pension wealth of future generations (except in 
France – though some steps in this regard were taken in 2010). 
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Figure 6: Development of pressure of system constraints over the next decades 
 
AU
DEFI
FR
HU
IT
PL
SE
SK
UK
5
15
25
35
45
6 8 10 12 14 16
Co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
 re
qu
ir
ed
  (
%
 o
f l
if
et
im
e 
w
ag
es
)
Net Pension Wealth (Years of average wages)
2005 Post-reform
 
In this lecture I focused on aggregate results, but underlying this are very different impacts by 
income and gender. While systems should remain broadly adequate across these ten countries, some 
countries are abandoning their previous aims, and this could pose risks for those on low incomes. Is 
this result an inevitable consequence of systemic changes to NDC or individual accounts? Not 
necessarily. For instance, Sweden appears to have managed to conduct these changes in a way that 
does not disadvantage those on low incomes and women.  
Governments across Europe have tended to sacrifice the income smoothing role rather than 
poverty alleviation. They have tried to reduce the future burden on taxpayers but generally maintained 
pension wealth of future generations similar to that of current pensioners. Labour participation can 
help undo generosity cuts. In some countries, there is a clear need to improve labour market outcomes 
or give credits to disadvantaged groups. 
Longevity still poses large risks. It is important for policymakers to understand its 
implications both for financial sustainability and also for pension adequacy.  
 
